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First Amendment Limitations On The
Confidentiality Of Lawyer
Disciplinary And Disability
Proceedings
By WILu H. ERICKSON*
INTRODUCTION
Lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings give rise to
a myriad of constitutional issues. One of the more problem-
producing areas is the attempt to conduct and review discipli-
nary proceedings in such a manner as to avoid damaging the
individual attorney and his professional reputation should the
charges against him prove groundless. In an effort to provide
such protection, the American Bar Assocation (ABA) in its
Standards for Lawyer Disciplinary and Disability Proceedings
has suggested guidelines and directions for disciplinary ac-
tions. Among these protections is a requirement that attorney
discipline and disability proceedings be kept confidential by
those participating in the proceedings.
This article will focus on two questions which arise from
attempts to keep such proceedings confidential. The first is a
question of policy: What degree of confidentiality is desirable?
The second question is one of constitutional law: What limits
does the first amendment impose upon requirements of
confidentiality? In order to provide a foundation for the formu-
lation of rules governing confidentiality, this analysis will focus
on the ABA standards.' A further advantage of using the Disci-
* Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Judicial-Member-at-Large on the
Board of Governors of the American Bar Association. The assistance of my Law Clerk,
Steven G. Francis, in researching the issues reviewed in this article is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
I ABA STANDARDS FOR LAwYER DIScIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1978)
[hereinafter cited as DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS]. Section 8.24 of the Disciplinary Stan-
dards provides:
Proceedings Normally Not Public Until Filing and Service of Formal
Charges. Prior to the filing and service of formal charges, the proceeding
should be confidential, except that the pendency, subject matter, and status
of an investigation may be disclosed if:
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plinary Standards stems from the disparity in the degree to
which various jurisdictions mandate confidentiality.' Basi-
cally, the ABA Disciplinary Standards provide that proceed-
ings shall remain confidential until a formal complaint has
been filed with the appropriate tribunal.
(a) the respondent has waived confidentiality;
(b) the proceeding is based upon conviction of a crime;
(c) the proceeding is based upon allegations that have become generally
known to the public.
The comments to that rule note that:
The confidentiality that attaches prior to a finding of probable cause and the
filing of formal charges is primarily for the benefit of the respondent to
protect him against publicity predicated upon unfounded accusations. See,
State v. Turner, 528 P.2d 966 (Kan. 1975); Baggott v. Hughes, 296 N.E.2d
696 (Ohio 1973).
If the respondent waives confidentiality or if the nature of the accusation
is already known to the public, the basis for confidentiality no longer exists.
Moreover, refusal of the agency to acknowledge the existence of an investiga-
tion when allegations of misconduct against a lawyer are publicly known only
serves to embarrass the agency by implying it is unaware of or uninterested
in allegations of misconduct, without in any way protecting the reputation
of the lawyer.
Section 8.25 provides:
Proceeding Public Upon Filing of Formal Charges. Upon the filing and ser-
vice of formal charges, the proceeding should be public, except for:
(a) deliberations of the hearing committee, board or court; and
(b) information with respect to which the hearing committee has issued a
protective order.
The comments accompanying that rule observe that:
Once a finding of probable cause has been made, there is no longer a danger
that the allegations against the respondent are frivolous. The need to assure
the integrity of the disciplinary process in the eyes of the public requires that
at this point further proceedings be open to the public. An announcement
that a lawyer accused of serious misconduct has been exonerated after a
hearing behind closed doors will be suspect. The same disposition will com-
mand respect if the public has had access to the evidence.
Upon a showing of good cause, any individual should be able to seek a
protective order requiring that the hearing be conducted in such a way as to
preserve the confidentiality of the information which is the subject of the
request.
2 Several states open disciplinary proceedings to the public upon a determination
of probable cause. See, e.g., Rule 11.12(5), art. XI, THE INTEGRATION RULES OF THE FLA.
BAR; Rule 4-215(d), RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND GOVENMErr
OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA; and Rule 15.28, PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
OF THE STATE BAR GRIEVANCE BOARD, supplementing Rule 15 of the RULES OF THE
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT. Many others maintain confidentiality until a much later
date. See, e.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 259(a); PA. R. OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 402; Rule
20, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS (Massachusetts).
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
I. LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. VIRGINIA
A. The Issue Before the Court
The Virginia Constitution creates a "Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission. . .with the power to investigate charges
which would be the basis for the retirement, censure, or re-
moval of a judge."' 3 The enabling legislation which imple-
mented the constitutional mandate provides that proceedings
before the commission shall remain confidential until a com-
plaint is filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia.' After a
complaint is filed, the commission records are opened to public
view.
The Virginia Pilot, a newspaper owned by Landmark
Communications, Inc., published an accurate report of confi-
dential commission proceedings.5 The report identified the
judge under investigation. As a result of this publication,
Landmark was convicted for violating a Virginia misdemeanor
statute' which prohibited divulgence of information concerning
judicial inquiry and review proceedings before the filing of a
complaint. In affirming the convictions,7 the Virginia Supreme
Court held that Landmark's first amendment s right to publish
without governmental interference was outweighed by the
"clear and present danger to the orderly administration of jus-
tice [which] would be created by divulgence of the confiden-
tial proceedings of the Commission."9 Furthermore, the court
found a sufficiently compelling state interest in the desire to
protect .the reputation of judges and the courts as well as to
prevent recrimination against complainants and witnesses."'
3 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
I VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973). Similarly, the American Bar Association provides
that the records of judicial disciplinary proceedings shall be made public upon the
filing of a formal complaint. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION 1.22
and comment thereto, at 56-57 (1974).
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978).
1971 Va. Acts Ex. Sess., ch. 154.
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 233 S.E.2d 120 (Va. 1977).
The first amendment provides, in part, that: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
233 S.E.2d at 126.
" Id. at 128-29. For further consideration of this policy, see ABA STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATVES AND PROCEDURFS 4.4(b) and comments thereto, at
225 (1967).
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The United States Supreme Court found there was no dan-
ger to the "orderly administration of justice" and reversed the
conviction. The High Court also declared that the state inter-
ests involved did not provide sufficient reason "for repressing
speech that would otherwise be free.""
The United States Supreme Court's opinion raises several
questions more serious and complex than the narrow question
it considered and answered. The Court's holding rests upon its
determination that the first amendment did not permit pun-
ishment for truthful disclosure by persons who were not in-
volved in the proceedings. 2 But the Court, in dicta, strongly
suggested that states may still keep judicial disciplinary pro-
ceedings confidential.'3 The opinion reiterated the oft-repeated
dictum that courts may promulgate rules which restrain those
privy to its proceedings from commenting on them publicly,"
and punish "participants for breach of this mandate"' 5 with
contempt of court. The problems inherent in imposing such
restraints on participants in judicial proceedings have not been
fully addressed by the Supreme Court.
B. The Issues Left Unresolved
Although the Court's opinion contains language allowing
courts to adopt rules mandating confidentiality and to enforce
those rules through use of the contempt power,' 6 the Supreme
Court specifically declined to answer three essential questions.
" Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1978) (quot-
ing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964)). In support of this
statement, the Court cited several cases which reversed contempt convictions for com-
ments concerning the courts. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Since the Court found the threat to the courts more
substantial in those cases, it saw no reason to treat the less serious threat in Landmark
differently. 98 S. Ct. at 1544.
J' 98 S. Ct. at 1540.
'3 "[Miuch of the risk can be eliminated through careful internal procedures to
protect the confidentiality of Commission proceedings." Id. at 1545. See also id. at
1542, n.12.
" See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
98 S. Ct. at 1540-41.
" See the authorities cited in note 2 supra, for attempts to implement this sugges-
tion.
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The first question left unanswered is whether the court
system is constitutionally required to open its disciplinary pro-
ceedings to the public at some point-that is, whether the pub-
lic or the press has a "right of access" to those proceedings.
The second question which must be resolved before consti-
tutionally valid rules can be drafted is: By what standards will
courts and participants in confidential proceedings identify the
speech which is prohibited?
The third issue left unresolved by Landmark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Virginia is delicately intertwined with the second:
How can a court identify and restrain speech in advance of its
publication and not run afoul of the constitutional bias against
prior restraints? 7
1. "The Right of Access"
Legal scholars have put forth many arguments justifying
a public right of access to information within the state's con-
trol. 8 The United States Supreme Court has found only a lim-
ited constitutional basis for this asserted right. 9
In Pell v. Procunier" and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., '
two of the more significant cases which have discussed this
issue, representatives of the news media challenged prison reg-
ulations which barred the press from interviewing specific in-
mates selected by the press. The Supreme Court upheld the
regulation on two grounds. First, the Court noted that even
11 See Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 485 (1977); Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Have We Seen The
Last of Prior Restraints on The Reporting of Judicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis L.J.
654 (1976).
" See, e.g., Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
1. "The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in order to instruct
its servant, the government. . . .[11f democracy is to work, there can be no holding
back of information; otherwise ultimate decision-making by the people, to whom that
function is committed, becomes impossible." Id. at 14.
1' The Court has found a limited right to receive information. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). It
has also, on occasion, allowed would-be listeners to assert the first amendment rights
of would-be speakers. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408
(1974).
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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though the press and the public were denied face-to-face en-
counters with selected inmates, they had many other means of
access to information about conditions in state and federal
prisons. 21 Second, the opinion pointed out that the regulations
which barred interviews were not "part of an attempt by the
State to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the
press' investigation and reporting of those conditions."
In much the same way, the public's need for information
concerning attorney discipline and disability proceedings is
satisfied by the Disciplinary Standards. Disability proceedings
in which a formal charge has been filed,24 or in which certain
other criteria have been met,2 5 are open to the public. Little
would be served by the disclosure of complaints against an
attorney which later proved groundless. The Disciplinary
Standards are not designed to conceal the processes by which
the public is protected from attorneys in need of discipline.
Rather, they are designed to protect attorneys from the public
calumny which can result from even the most baseless charges.
Thus, whatever the limits of the so-called "right to know"
doctrine, the right is adequately protected by opening the pro-
ceedings to the public after a formal charge is filed. The public
and the press have no constitutional "right to access" to initial
discipline and disability proceedings which the courts have
determined should be confidential. Moreover, participants in
those proceedings who violate the mandates of confidentiality
will not be protected by a constitutional right of access or by a
''reporter's privilege" to refuse to reveal the names of those who
have violated that mandate. 6
2. Identifying the Speech to be Restrained
One essential attribute of any statute or court rule which
2 The Court noted that prisoners can send and receive mail, Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 824 (1974); have personal visitors, id. at 824-25; and that the press cim
interview any of the 12,000 inmates of federal prisons who are released each year. Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 848 n.9 (1974).
2 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830.
21 For the text of § 8.25, see note 1 supra.
2 For the text of § 8.24, see note 1 supra.
26 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Farr v. Superior Court, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
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impinges on first amendment rights is that the prohibition
must target the speech to be suppressed with some precision.
The test by which that speech is identified has had numerous
formulations.
The most common test employed by the Court is to allow
suppression only of speech which presents a "clear and present
danger" of some substantive evil .2 A classic example is seen in
Brandenburg v. Ohio2 where the Supreme Court declared that
the state could only punish speech which was "directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action," and "likely to
incite or produce such action. 12 9 In Bridges v. California"t' a
labor leader was convicted of contempt because he threatened
to call for a strike which would close the seaports of the West-
ern United States unless California refrained from enforcing a
particular labor decision. The United States Supreme Court
held that the California courts could not punish the defendant
for contempt unless his statements caused the danger of preju-
dice to the court's ability to enforce its orders to be "extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."'3 The
Court reversed his conviction because it was unable to conclude
that his threat was of such a magnitude.3 2
A somewhat different approach was taken by the Court in
Dennis v. United States." There the Court adopted the lan-
guage of Judge Learned Hand: "[W]hether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies [the State's]
invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger." 34
While this language was reaffirmed in Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart,"5 Chief Justice Burger did not cite Dennis v. United
' Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes,
J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined
by Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
- 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
"Id. at 447.
- 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
, Id. at 263.
32 "If Bridges' threat to cripple the economy of the entire West Coast did not
present danger enough, the lesson of the case must be that almost nothing said outside
the courtroom is punishable as contempt." L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW
624 (1978).
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
' Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
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States or Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart in his opinion for the
Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia. Still,
the test posed in Landmark Communications is strongly remi-
niscent of the Hand formulation. The Landmark opinion, in
reviewing the clear and present danger test employed by the
Virginia Supreme Court, may create some confusion as to the
proper standard which courts should apply in their attempts to
keep attorney discipline and disability proceedings confiden-
tial.
The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on the clear and
present danger test in rejecting Landmark's claim. We ques-
tion the relevance of that standard here; moreover we cannot
accept the mechanical application of the test which led that
court to its conclusion. Mr. Justice Holmes' test was never
intended "to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey
a formula for adjudicating cases." Properly applied, the test
requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence
and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular
utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, as
well as its likelihood, -against the need for free and unfettered
expression. The possibility that other measures will serve the
State's interests should also be weighed.36
This statement may be read in two ways. The Chief Jus-
tice could be saying that the clear and present danger test is
inadequate and that it must be replaced by the Hana language.
Or, Hand's formulation may be viewed merely as a definition
of the clear and present danger test. Despite the fact that the
Hand test has not been employed in a sufficient number of
cases to give the lower courts guidance, it is clear that the
Court will require a substantial cause and effect relationship
between the speech restrained and the evil sought to be pre-
vented.
3. Prior Restraints
The first amendment's guarantee of free speech does per-
mit limited regulation by governmental authorities under ap-
propriate circumstances. On several occasions, the United
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virgnia, 96 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1978) (cita-
tions omitted).
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States Supreme Court has recognized certain state or individ-
ual interests as being paramount to a speaker's need for expres-
sion or to society's need to hear that speaker. Such speech can
result in the imposition of sanctions.3 7 If some speech is so
detrimental to the orderly processes of society that it can be
punished after the fact, the Supreme Court has concluded that
it can be prohibited or regulated in advance.
Prior restraints on speech strike at the heart of first
amendment freedoms and are therefore suspect in every in-
stance. 8 The Supreme Court has often stated that any "system
of prior restraints of expression comes to th[eJ Court bearing
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. ' ' '39
Again, however, prior restraints have been upheld in limited
instances. An examination of the cases establishes the bounda-
ries which must be honored if restraints on speech are to be
imposed on those participating in lawyer disciplinary and disa-
bility proceedings.'
The Supreme Court has permitted broad restraints when
3 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conspir-
acy); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("fighting words");
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (national security) (dictum).
" Ordinarily, the State's constitutionally permissible interests are ade-
quately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak has
been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached. The impact and conse-
quences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are materially different
from those of prior restraint. Prior restraint upon speech suppresses the
precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against
abridgement.
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1968).
11 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976); Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States
(Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
40 The United States has struck down prior restraints even when those restraints
were justified by the most pressing needs of the state. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam) (court proceedings); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (regulation of musical performance at playhouse operated by city);
New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curiam) (national security); Organization For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971) (privacy); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (regulation of pornog-
raphy); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67
the sovereign has sought to regulate business activity.4' While
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc.42 elevated commercial speech to a constitutional level,
the Supreme Court still took care to point out that the objec-
tive nature of "speech that does 'no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction'-4 makes it particularly liable to regula-
tion for the non-ideological protection of consumers44 and sup-
pression of falsity.45 In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,4" the
Supreme Court expanded the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case
by declaring that the first amendment was abrogated by a total
ban on advertising by attorneys. As with Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy, the Court left the door open for regulation of
some forms of speech, such as in-person solicitation and adver-
tising which referred to the quality of a lawyer's work product.
4 7
The strong governmental interest in suppressing discrimina-
tion has also provided the basis for the imposition of restraints
on speech.48
Probably the most detailed and confused guidelines have
been created in cases relating to censorship of obscenity." In
4, In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), a newspaper which
enjoyed an effective monopoly of news distribution was enjoined from refusing to
accept advertisements from business which also advertised on a competing radio sta-
tion. The defendant's first amendment objections were dismissed on the grounds that
the newspaper had attempted to monopolize interstate commerce.
Although the case represents a prior order to publish, rather than a prior restraint
on publication, the Supreme Court has equated these concepts. Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Cf., Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (by-laws of a cooperative news service prohibited members from selling
news to non-members).
42 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 771, n.24.
Id. at 772, n.24.
'5 Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring).
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
" Id. at 366. The Court has since approved state regulation of in-person solicita-
tion. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. 1925 (1978).
" See Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973), where the Court approved a prohibition of help-wanted advertisements
phrased as "male only" or "female only." The state's authority was seen as arising
from its mandate to reduce discrimination. It is important to note that the prohibition
avoided condemnation as a prior restraint only because there was an adequate judicial
determination that the speed could be proscribed. Id. at 390.
" See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. Rxv. 1;
Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 203; Lockhart,
Escape From the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA.
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Times Film Corp. v. Chicago,50 the Court upheld a Chicago
ordinance which required that all films be submitted to the
police commissioner for review before they could be exhibited
to the public. The challenge to the ordinance was based on the
claim that no prior restraint of speech could ever be constitu-
tional. Relief was denied because of the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that prior restraints were not invalid per se.51
Freedman v. Maryland2 presented another case where a
motion picture exhibitor refused to submit his film for prior
review by a governmental agency. But the appellant in
Freedman justified his refusal, not on absolute principles of
constitutional law, but on specific flaws in the Maryland mo-
tion picture censorship statute. In upholding the appellant's
contentions as to the statute's shortcomings, the Supreme
Court laid down the basic procedures a state must provide
before it can censor speech in advance of publication:
[T]he exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative
judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified
brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain
showing the film. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final
judicial determination on the merits must similarly be lim-
ited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed
period compatible with sound judicial resolution....
[T]he procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial
decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and
possibly erroneous denial. ....
Finally, we can turn for guidance to a case involving judi-
cially imposed restraints on the speech of participants in judi-
cial proceedings or representatives of the press who wished to
report them. Again, in addition to requiring a sufficiently im-
L. REV. 533 (1975); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974).
365 U.S. 43 (1961). The Chicago ordinance was finally overturned in Teitel Film
Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
51 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961).
52 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
51 Id. at 58-59. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), for a prior
restraint scheme which met the Court's standards. The Court's insistence upon a
speedy judicial determination is also apparent in National Socialist Party of America
v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per curiam). See Southeastern Promotion's
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554-55, 560 (1975) for detailed guidelines.
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portant state interest, the case reflects the concern that the
speech proscribed be targeted with precision and that judicial
determinations on the protected status of the speech be made
with all due speed.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart" is the landmark case on
prior restraints in this area. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart
struck down a state district court order prohibiting publication
of certain facts about an accused murderer. For a variety of
reasons, the Supreme Court concluded that the order could not
be squared with the law of prior restraints. 5 The opinion specif-
ically addressed the dangers presented by the delays inherent
in any system of prior restraints:
Some news can be delayed and most commentary can even
more readily be delayed without serious injury, and there is
often a self-imposed delay when responsible editors call for
verification of information. But such delays are normally
slight and they are self-imposed. Delays imposed by govern-
mental authority are a different matter. 6
• ..As a practical matter, moreover, the element of time
is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional
function of bringing news to the public promptly.57
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart also discussed the question
of how sufficiently to identify beforehand the speech which will
be punished. One part of the district court order, as modified
by the Nebraska Supreme Court, prohibited the dissemination
of all "information strongly implicative of the accused as the
perpetrator of the slayings." 58 The Supreme Court struck down
this prohibition because the language was "too vague" and
"too broad.""
These cases illustrate the basic outlines of a constitution-
ally valid system of prior restraints: (1) Speech cannot be re-
strained unless that restraint serves a fundamental state inter-
" 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
See Erickson and Prettyman, note 17 supra, for a further discussion of this case.
427 U.S. at 560.
Id. at 561.
State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805 (Neb. 1975).
" 427 U.S. at 568.
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est which cannot be protected by less drastic means." (2) The
speech which is subject to prohibition must be identified as
precisely as circumstances will allow.6' (3) The time which
elapses between the request to speak and a final judicial deter-
mination on whether the speech can be restrained must be
brief.8 2 (4) The state must bear the burden of initiating the
proceedings which will lead to that determination, as well as
the burden of persuading the court that the speech can be
restrained constitutionally. 3 If these tests are met, prior re-
straints can be imposed "where the expected loss from imped-
ing speech in advance is minimized by the unusual clarity of
the prepublication showing of harm."" Clearly, this outline can
be employed to establish a system of confidentiality in attorney
disciplinary proceedings.
H. PRIOR RESTRAINTS IN LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND
DISABILTY PROCEEDINGS
A. Prior Restraints on the Speech of Lawyers
A lawyer has the same first amendment rights as any other
person, but he faces added responsibility to his profession and
to the courts for any abuse of his duties and responsibilities.
For example, the trial of a celebrated case requires a lawyer to
0 The interest must be such that restraint of speech is mandatory. See Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
In addition, speech cannot be restrained in advance of publication absent a judicial
determination that less restrictive alternatives will be ineffective. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
"1 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. 1925 (1978); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 553-54 (1975); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427
U.S. 912 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 444 (1957). Or the restraint can be sthyed pending an authoritative judicial deter-
mination that the speech is unprotected. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
0 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975).
" TRIBE, supra note 32, at 729.
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gauge carefully statements which may reach the news media,
to insure that the rights of the litigants are not prejudiced, and
to insure that a fair trial is forthcoming. 5
In all states, the privilege to appear as an advocate before
the courts is granted only to those admitted to the bar and to
the parties to the case.66 That privilege provides the attorney
with sufficient opportunity to satisfy his first amendment
rights to freedom of expression. So long as he acts with pro-
priety" and submits his objections to the forum in which his
case is being heard, the lawyer is beyond censure for even the
most severe criticism of the law and the court. 8
But the lawyer must recognize that with this privilege
come corollary restraints. The courtroom should be a place
wherein is carried out a quiet, dignified search for truth. 9 A
lawyer bears a particular responsibility to observe the restric-
tions which a court may place upon his extrajudicial state-
ments. This duty will often restrain speech which is otherwise
constitutionally protected. 0
The realization that the attorney, as a condition to being
admitted to practice law, has agreed to be bound by court rules
of confidentiality is merely the beginning of an inquiry into
whether such strictures coincide with first amendment free-
doms. The state may premise a privilege to practice law on the
applicant's willingness to accept certain conditions.7 ' However,
a promise to waive part of one's first amendment rights is en-
forceable only if the limitation agreed to does not violate the
rights the applicant would have retained had he not made the
promise .71
The effect of the above discussed principles on a problem
65 DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-107 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBIUTY [hereinafter cited as DR].
6 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
,7 DR 1-102.
" Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965).
,' Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1 (1960).
10 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 746-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
7, United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973) (Hatch Act). Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
72 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
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similar to the subject of this article can be seen by examining
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-107 of the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility. That rule requires an at-
torney in a criminal case to avoid making statements during
both the selection of the jury and the trial which "are reasona-
bly likely to interfere with a fair trial." DR 7-107 and similar
rules silencing attorneys have occasioned extensive commen-
tary and criticism. 73 The most comprehensive discussion to
date is presented in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer.74
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer presented an attack
on a local district court criminal rule similar to DR 7-107. The
Seventh Circuit invalidated the rule because, in its view, the
"reasonable likelihood" standard restricted an attorney's free-
dom of expression more than is necessary to secure impartial
trials and protect the processes of the courts.
The court concluded that "less drastic means ' 75 were
available to protect the defendant's sixth amendment right to
a fair trial and to preserve the institutional integrity of the
judicial system. As for the statements prohibited, the court
ruled that "[o]nly those comments that pose a 'serious and
imminent threat' of interference with the fair administration of
justice can be constitutionally proscribed. ' 76 The total ban
would have resulted in establishing violations for making a
"trivial, totally innocuous statement. '7
73 See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago
Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. La. 1977); Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D.
Texas 1974); Farr v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011
(1972); Note, Attorney Discipline and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 922
(1974); Comment, Silence Orders-Preserving Political Expression by Defendants and
Their Lawyers, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 595 (1971); Comment, Controlling Lawyers
by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 301, 374, 388-89 (1970).
74 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago
Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
7' 522 F.2d at 249.
7, Id. at 249. But see United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969), withholding the "reasonable likelihood" standard in a case
where extrajudicial comments by defendants resulted in contempt citations.
7 522 F.2d at 251. Chicago Council has not survived without criticism. See, e.g.,
Note, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer: Gag Rules-The First Amendment vs. The
Sixth, 30 Sw. L.J. 507 (1976). The note suggests that the "reasonable likelihood"
standard upheld by United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit found fault in the drafting of the
rule, not in its purpose. However, even the Seventh Circuit,
which has voiced the strongest objections to date concerning
restraints on extrajudicial comments by lawyers, has recog-
nized that some form of control over interference with the jus-
tice system is permissible.
[W]e think there is a place and need for specific provisions
in properly drawn rules. Lawyers must be aware of exactly
what areas of speech might pose a serious and imminent
threat of interference with a fair trial. The serious and immi-
nent standard must always be an element of any prohibition.
We think that it is proper to formulate rules which would
declare that comment concerning certain matters will pre-
sumptively be deemed a serious and imminent threat to the
fair administration of justice so as to justify a prohibition
against them. One charged with violating such a rule would
of course have the opportunity to prove that his statement
was not one that posed such a serious and imminent threat,
but the burden would be upon him.78
Clearly such restraints, so long as they are properly
drafted, are within the power of the courts. The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly said, albeit in dictum, that law-
yers involved in pending cases can be prevented from com-
menting on those cases.79 Indeed, it has been suggested that the
sixth amendment may require their silence. 0 Unless we are to
assume that the Supreme Court is leading the judiciary down
the primrose path to reversible error, we must assume that it
means what it says.
Further support for the proposition that lawyers are sub-
ject to restraints upon their extrajudicial statements can be
found in In re Sawyer.81 In that case, a lawyer representing a
396 U.S. 990 (1969), is constitutionally required, since the Court in Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), suggested that the defendant need only show a "probability"
of prejudice before he can request gag orders.
79 522 F.2d at 251.
1, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978); Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977) (per curiam); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361
(1966).
11 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
91 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
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defendant accused of violating the Smith Act 2 was disciplined
by the Hawaiian Territorial Court because she made a public
speech during the course of the trial. In that speech the lawyer
trenchantly criticized the wisdom of prosecutions under that
Act, and made a number of comments which arguably reflected
on the intelligence and integrity of the judge conducting the
trial. The Supreme Court reversed the disciplinary action.
Speaking for a four-man plurality, Justice Brennan held that
the evidence was insufficient to support the disciplinary action.
Although the case was briefed and argued primarily on first
amendment grounds, the plurality opinion specifically did not
"reach or intimate any conclusion on the constitutional issues
presented.""
Justice Stewart, concurring in the result, agreed with the
plurality's holding that the charges were not proved, but he
pointedly refused to join in Justice Brennan's avoidance of the
first amendment issue.Y
A lawyer belongs to a profession which inherited standards of
propriety and honor, which experience has shown necessary
in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of justice. He
who would follow that calling must conform to those stan-
dards. Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention
from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally
protected speech."
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the four dissenting Jus-
tices remains today a profound statement of the responsibili-
ties assumed by a lawyer:
An attorney actively engaged in the conduct of a trial is not
merely another citizen. He is an intimate and trusted and
essential part of the machinery of justice, an "officer of the
court" in the most compelling sense. He does not lack for a
forum in which to make his charges of unfairness or failure
to adhere to principles of law; he has ample chance to make
such claims to the courts in which he litigates. As long as any
tribunal bred in the fundamentals of our legal tradition, ulti-
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976).
360 U.S. at 627.
m Id. at 636.
"Id. at 646-47.
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mately this Court, still exercises judicial power those claims
will be heard and heeded."
Thus, five members of the Sawyer Court would have per-
mitted the discipline of a lawyer for speech which would have
been protected had it issued from the mouth of a non-lawyer.
Justice Brennan, who spoke for the plurality in In re Sawyer,
cited that case for this proposition in his concurring opinion in
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart:
As officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a
fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that
will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will
obstruct the fair administration of justice. It is very doubtful
that the court would not have the power to control release of
information by these individuals in appropriate cases, See In
Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959), and to impose suitable limi-
tations whose transgression would result in disciplinary pro-
ceedings.87
Given the approving reference to this passage in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, doubts about the court's
power in this respect should be laid to rest.
B. Prior Restraints on Respondents in Lawyer Disciplinary
and Disability Proceedings
Any attempt to impose a prior restraint on a respondent
lawyer in a lawyer disciplinary or disability proceeding may
run afoul not only of the first amendment, but also of the sixth
amendment. A respondent lawyer enjoys the same freedom of
speech which is guaranteed to other participants in the pro-
ceeding. But, in addition, he can point to his sixth amendment
right to a "public trial." 8 The Supreme Court has thus far only
mId. at 668.
427 U.S. 539, 601, n.27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Mr. Justice
Stewart's approving reference to In re Sawyer in his concurring opinion in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1978). After noting the state
interest in confidentiality, the Justice commented that "I find nothing in the Constitu-
tion to prevent Virginia from punishing those who violate this confidentiality." Id. at
1546.
u "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ...... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The general view is that lawyer discipline
and disability proceedings are neither criminal nor civil, but sui generis. See, e.g.,
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been confronted with cases in which it construed the defen-
dants' right to a public trial in light of his right to an "impartial
jury."89 Few courts have addressed the problem raised when a
defendant insists that his trial be made public while the state
asserts policies which require the proceedings in which he is
tried to be kept confidential.
United States v. Tijerina90 presented such a case. How-
ever, the posture in which the case was presented to the court
renders much of its opinion merely advisory.
Before trial, the defendants' lawyers consented to the im-
position of a judicial "gag" order over all lawyers, defendants,
and witnesses during the pendency of the proceedings. In viola-
tion of this order, two of the defendants made public speeches
concerning the trial and were convicted of contempt. The
Tenth Circuit, in affirming the conviction, noted that the
agreement to abide by the gag order should have disposed of
the case. However, because of "the circumstances of the case"
the court went on to consider the constitutional claims pre-
sented. The defendants contended that, since the order was
entered for their own protection, they could not be punished for
violating it. The court said:
The public has an overriding interest that justice be done in
a controversy between the government and individuals and
has the right to demand and expect "fair trials designed to
end in just judgments." [Citing cases]. This objective may
be thwarted unless an order against extrajudicial statements
applies to all parties to a controversy. The concept of a fair
trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense. 1
Yokozeki v. State Bar, 521 P.2d 858, 865 (Cal. 1974); ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLNARY AND DIsABmurr PROCEEDINGS, § 1.2. Thus, the sixth amendment does not
automatically apply to disciplinary proceedings. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has noted the degree to which the concept of a public trial is interwoven into
the fabric of our society. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The Disciplinary Standards
have postulated a respondent lawyer's privilege to have proceedings against him made
open to the public. See note 1, supra, for the text of the relevant section. Those
Standards have also suggested that lawyers be granted the right to cross-examine
witnesses, § 8.35 (see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)); the right to counsel, §
8.33 (see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)); and the right to discovery, § 8.29
(see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
"1 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976). See, e.g., Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 666 (citations omitted).
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Similar language has been employed by the Supreme
Court. In Sheppard v. Maxwell the Court stated that:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that
will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interfer-
ences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under
the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate
its function.2
Despite the generalized statements quoted above, there
are persuasive arguments that constitutional objections to re-
straining the speech of defendants may still remain. The main
argument is that open speech is the defendant's only means of
countering public opinion that he is, in fact, guilty as charged.9 3
Several Standards suggested by the ABA have noted the diffi-
culties involved in imposing restraints on the free speech guar-
anteed to respondent lawyers in disciplinary proceedings and
defendants in criminal trials. -Section 8.24 of the Disciplinary
Standards provides that the respondent may waive confiden-
tiality in proceedings which would otherwise be closed to the
public. 4 In regard to court-imposed restraints in criminal pros-
ecutions, the first Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press (1968) observed that:
Several comments on the report have suggested that the pro-
posed restrictions ought not to apply to defense counsel at all.
The argument is that the primary threat is to the accused,
that the inability to reply weights the scales even more heav-
ily in favor of the state, and that restrictions on defense coun-
sel are far more likely to lead to abuse than those on the
prosecution.
• . . While recognizing the difficulty and importance of
the question, the Committee believes that the proposed re-
striction should be retained . . . . [T]he prosecution is al-
ready somewhat disfavored by the fact that the proposed
92 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). "[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extra-
judicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged
prejudicial matters .... ." Id. at 361.
,1 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975); cert.
denied sub nom, Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
'1 See note 1 supra in which the text of this section is set out.
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restrictions do not-and probably could not-apply to the
defendant himself, who does not have the same fiduciary
obligation to the administration of justice as his attorney. 5
The second edition of the Standards Relating to Fair Trial
and Free Press (1978) has taken an even stronger position on
the first amendment rights of defendants in criminal trials:
[C]riminal defendants .. .are never in court voluntar-
ily. . . .Even though complete forbearance from extrajudi-
cial statements may be desirable generally, no binding in-
struction on parties . . .should be authorized . . . .Once
parties. . . in a criminal case are outside the courtroom, they
have the full prerogatives of any private citizen to question,
criticize, or condemn the actions of government even though
they may be swept up in its processes at the time."
Thus courts, in forming confidentiality rules in attorney
disciplinary and disability proceedings, should recognize that
respondents in such cases have no less right than other partici-
pants to be free of prior restraints on their speech and, in fact,
may have considerably more.
CONCLUSION
The Disciplinary Standards provide evidence that the
legal profession is deeply concerned about the need to adminis-
ter promptly and fairly discipline to those lawyers who fail to
honor their obligations to the profession and their clients. The
confidentiality provisions of the Disciplinary Standards are
important aspects in the implementation of that goal. Hope-
fully, the Disciplinary Standards will be reviewed and adopted
by most states. However, the Disciplinary Standards have not
addressed all the issues raised in this article.
The appendix to this article contains a suggested rule for-
mulated to deal with the first amendment issues raised in at-
tempts to insure confidentiality. The manner in which the
states handle this problem will determine the accessability of
these proceedings to the media. If a state finds it desirable to
"
5ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAro TRIAL AND FRM PRESS 19-20 (1968).
" Commentary to Standard 8-3.6 of ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAiR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS (1978), at 26.
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
establish a rule which defines the first amendment limitations
in lawyer disciplinary proceedings, the rule proposed in this
article may provide a starting point.
V. PROPOSED RULE GOVERNING REQUESTS TO MAKE PUBLIC
STATEMENTS CONCERNING LAWYER DISCIPLINARY OR DISABILITY
PROCEEDINGS WHICH RULE 8.24 OR RULE 8.2511 REQUIRE TO BE
CONFIDENTIAL
Proposed Rule 8.251:
(a) If a witness, employee of the hearing committee, or
lawyer connected with any lawyer disciplinary or disability
proceeding who is requied by Rule 8.24 or Rule 8.25 to maintain
confidentiality wishes to make a public statement concerning
that proceeding, he shall submit a written copy of the proposed
statement to the hearing committee before making the public
statement. The proposed public statement shall be accompa-
nied by a written brief setting forth the reasons why the state-
ment should be permitted.
(b) Within two days"8 after receipt of the proposed public
statement and the brief, the hearing committee shall issue
written conclusions in which it (i) denies the request to make
the proposed public statement; (ii) grants the request to make
the proposed public statement; (iii) grants the request to make
the proposed public statement, on condition that it be modified
in the manner proposed by the hearing committee; or (iv)
grants the request to make the public statement, on the condi-
tion that publication of that statement be accompanied by the
publication of such other information, which, in the opinion of
the hearing committee, is necessary to make the proposed pub-
lic statement not misleading or prejudicial to the respondent
or to the administration of that attorney discipline or disability
proceeding.99 The opinion of the hearing committee shall set
The text of these sections is contained in note 1 supra.
'7 The requisite brevity of the restraint has been emphasized repeatedly. See
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 55 (1965); Bantom Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963).
'9 Subsections (iii) and (iv) reflect the requirement that states seek the least
drastic means to implement their interests, when the state's action abridges funda-
mental rights. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535
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forth the harms that will result if the party is not permitted to
make the public statement; any foreseeable prejudice to the
respondent that may result if the public statement is permit-
ted; and any foreseeable interference with the administration
of the lawyer disciplinary or disability proceeding that may
result if the public statement is permitted.
(c) The hearing committee shall grant the request'00 to
make the public statement unless it concludes'0' that the pub-
lic statement presents a clear and present danger'0 of prejudice
to the respondent or of interference with the administration of
the lawyer disciplinary or disability proceeding, and that that
clear and present danger cannot be avoided by the modifica-
tion of the public statement, or by the release of additional
information concerning the proceeding to which the public
statement relates. It shall be presumed that any public state-
ment which identifies the respondent in a lawyer disciplinary
or disability proceeding will present a clear and present danger
of prejudice to the respondent. The party seeking permission
to make the public statement may overcome this presumption
by a showing supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 0 3
(d) If the hearing committee denies the request to make
the public statement, or imposes limitations, and the party
(1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
1® The presumption must be that the speech is protected. Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
0' The required specificity of that conclusion has never been spelled out. But see
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1962), for some guidelines.
0I Recent United States Supreme Court pronouncements on the proper test by
which prohibited speech is to be identified have been ambiguous. See note 36 and
accompanying text supra for a discussion of this test. However, the "clear and present
danger" test has never been held insufficient. Moreover, the Court relied on cases
which employed that standard in its opinion in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978). The American Bar Association also uses the clear and
present danger standard in its Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1978),
Standard 8-1.1.
203 The primary purpose of confidentiality in lawyer disciplinary and disability
proceedings is to protect the lawyer from the calumny attendant upon groundless
charges. The characterization of certain categories of speech as presumptively prejudi-
cial was suggested by the court in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427
U.S. 912 (1976).
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seeking permission to make the public statement is unwilling
to comply with the modifications proposed by the hearing com-
mittee or does not agree to the release of additional information
concerning the proceeding, review may be obtained by filing a
notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within two days.'0 The
notice of appeal shall be accompanied by the proposed public
statement, the written brief, and the conclusions of the hearing
committee. There will be no oral argument, and review will be
expedited by the Supreme Court.
(e) All time limits set forth in this rule may be extended
by stipulation of the hearing committee and the party request-
ing permission to make the public statement.
0I Again, the status quo must be preserved for the shortest time compatible with
sound resolution of the issue. See note 62 supra. As to the burden of seeking review,
and the burden of persuasion on review, see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975).
